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Presumed Equal: Shares of Cotenants
John V. Orth, Chapel Hill, North Carolina*

For most of the long history of the common law, land was the most
important asset and its ownership could be divided up in many ways.
An interest in real property could be a present interest, such as a life
estate or a fee simple; or it could be a future interest, such as a remainder or a reversion. Land could be held in trust for the benefit of another. A right to possession for a term of years could be created by a
lease. A right of use could be created by an easement. Duties incident
to ownership could be imposed by a real covenant or an equitable servitude. Land could be owned by one person in sole ownership, or it could
be owned by two or more concurrently as tenants in common or as joint
tenants.1 Married persons could take title to land as tenants by the
entirety.
At common law the shares of cotenants depended on the type of
estate. In tenancies by the entirety the shares were equal because each
spouse owned the whole, title being held not by two persons but by the
marital unit.2 In joint tenancies the shares were equal by definition. For
a joint tenancy to exist, the “four unities” of time, title, interest, and
* William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School
of Law. A.B. 1969, Oberlin College; J.D. 1974, M.A. 1975, Ph.D. 1977, Harvard University. Professor Orth contributes the chapters on concurrent estates in Thompson on Real
Property (Thomas ed.). His latest book is Reappraisals in the Law of Property (2010).
1 At common law the right of survivorship was an inherent feature of the estate of
joint tenancy, so did not need to be expressly mentioned. Over time, many states have to
one degree or another departed from the common law in this regard. In Michigan, which
continues to recognize the common law estate, a grant in joint tenancy “with right of
survivorship” creates an estate for joint lives with alternative contingent remainders.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.44 (2012). In North Carolina, by contrast, the right of survivorship must be expressed in order to create the statutory equivalent of the common law
joint tenancy. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (2012). See John V. Orth, The Joint Tenancy
Makes a Comeback in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REV. 491 (1991). For the remainder of
this article, I will use “joint tenancy” in its common law sense; that is, I will assume it
includes a right of survivorship.
2 Although originally conceived as a special type of sole, rather than concurrent,
ownership, the tenancy by the entirety is today usually treated as a special type of joint
tenancy – inseverable and inalienable except by the act of both parties to the marriage.
See John V. Orth, Tenancy by the Entirety: The Strange Career of the Common Law
Marital Estate, 1997 BYU L. REV. 35, 38-39 (1997).
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possession were required.3 If the shares of the cotenants were not
equal, the unity of interest would be lacking and the estate could not be
a joint tenancy. The tenancy in common required only the unity of possession, so the shares of cotenants could be unequal. But even here the
shares were presumed equal in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
Today the story is not so simple. Tenancies by the entirety that end
with the divorce of the spouses – a possibility unknown to the common
law – default into tenancies in common and are subject to equitable
distribution. Joint tenancies in many states are now exempted by statute
from the required unity of interest.4 While retaining the right of survivorship, the new joint tenancies otherwise resemble tenancies in common. In consequence, the presumption of equal shares that once
applied only to tenancies in common now extends to joint tenancies as
well, focusing additional attention on the evidence necessary to rebut it.
A clear expression of intention to hold other than equal shares poses no
difficulty. A will or deed could grant an estate to multiple grantees and
describe the respective shares of each. The problems arise when the
intention is implied rather than express.
The most common evidence of implied intention to hold unequal
shares is unequal contributions to the purchase price.5 A tenancy in
common could be acquired by a group of investors, each paying a different fractional share of the purchase price. Although professional investors are unlikely to leave their respective shares undefined, unequal
shares could be presumed in this case even without an express statement. Extending the presumption to tenancies in common that result
from the divorce of tenants by the entirety raised a new problem. In
many marriages the purchase price of real property titled in tenancies by
the entirety was supplied in unequal amounts by the spouses. One may
have supplied all the consideration. Or one spouse may have brought
previously owned real property into the marriage and retitled it in tenancy by the entirety. The same could be true with married persons tak3

The common law doctrine of the four unities required that joint tenants have
“one and the same interest, accruing by one and the same conveyance, commencing at
one and the same time, and held by one and the same undivided possession.” II WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 180 (William S Hein &
Co., Inc., 1992) (1766). All four unities had to be present at the creation of the joint
tenancy and throughout its continued existence. The loss of any one terminated the estate, causing it to default into a tenancy in common.
4 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-31-101(6)(a) (2012) (“The interests in a joint
tenancy may be equal or unequal.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(b) (“The interests of the
grantees holding property in joint tenancy with right of survivorship shall be deemed to
be equal unless otherwise specified in the conveyance.”).
5 For purposes of determining shares on partition the relevant contribution is contribution to the purchase price, not subsequent contributions, as to maintenance, taxes,
and insurance.
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ing title as joint tenants, a particularly common practice in states that no
longer recognize tenancies by the entirety. Joint tenancies are also
sometimes used by family members, particularly parents and children, as
a means to avoid probate.
To deal with this situation, a further presumption has developed.
Where there is a “family relationship” between the cotenants, the excess
contribution by one is presumed to be a gift to the other. In these cases,
then, the stacked presumptions are (1) the shares of cotenants are presumed equal absent evidence of an intention to the contrary; (2) unequal contributions to the purchase price are presumed to indicate an
intention to hold unequal shares; (3) unequal contributions by persons
in a family relationship are presumed to be gifts of the excess, not an
indication of an intention to hold unequal shares. In other words, the
third presumption cancels the second presumption and restores the first
presumption of equal shares.
Recent cases illustrate problems with applying these presumptions.
The source of the difficulty, as one might guess, concerns the “family
relationship.” What constitutes a family for purposes of the presumption? And, once a family relationship is recognized, are the shares of
cotenants then necessarily equal? In other words, does the presumption
of equal shares then become irrebuttable?
In Hofstad v. Christie,6 a cohabiting unmarried couple held title to
their home as tenants in common. When they separated, the male partner brought a partition action and claimed an unequal distribution of
the sale proceeds based on his unequal contribution to the purchase
price. The trial court found that the couple had a family relationship
and that the evidence of unequal contribution was insufficient to rebut
the presumption that a gift was intended, so it applied the presumption
of equal shares. On appeal the case required the Wyoming Supreme
Court to venture into the troubled area of defining a family. Finding the
question of a family relationship between unmarried tenants in common
one of first impression in the state, the court relied on precedent from
other states to affirm the trial court’s application of the presumption.7
Because the couple had raised two children of their own during their
extended cohabitation, the court found that they formed a family for the
purpose of determining their respective shares. Although the finding of
a family relationship in this case was heavily dependent on the fact that
they had cohabited and had raised children together, the decision seems
to indicate that the same result would have been reached in a case of
extended cohabitation whether children were begotten or not.
6

240 P.3d 816, 816 (Wyo. 2010).
Id. at 819-20 (citing Johnston v. Estate of Phillips, 706 S.W.2d 554 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986); Employment Dep’t v. Stock Secrets, Inc., 150 P.3d 1090 (Or. Ct. App. 2007)).
7
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If Hofstad demonstrated an emerging consensus to recognize a family relationship not based on blood or marriage, two recent cases gave
opposing answers to the question whether a family relationship, once
recognized, necessarily implied that the shares of cotenants were equal.
In re Killman,8 a bankruptcy case from the Western District of Missouri,
concerned the disposition of a bankrupt’s interest in a joint tenancy that
she held with her mother and sister. The joint tenancy had been created
years earlier by a gratuitous grant from the bankrupt’s widowed mother,
who had continued to reside on the property and pay all the expenses.9
Although the mother testified at the bankruptcy proceeding that she
had intended only to provide for her daughters’ succession at her death,
the bankruptcy judge found it “implausible that she failed to understand. . . that titling the property in her daughters’ names meant that the
daughters would have a current ownership interest in the property”10
and ordered a sale of the bankrupt’s share. Conceding that Missouri law
recognized that unequal contribution raised a presumption of unequal
shares – in this case the mother supplied the entire value – the bankruptcy judge relied on Missouri precedents that “unequal contribution is
irrelevant in determining the joint tenants’ respective shares when there
is a family relationship between the tenants or when there is evidence of
donative intent.”11 Because in this case the joint tenancy was held by
close family members, a mother and her two daughters, the fact of unequal contribution was irrelevant. The family relationship was conclusive
evidence of donative intent. The presumption of equal shares, in other
words, was irrebuttable.
Within months of the decision in Killman the Missouri Court of
Appeals for the Western District firmly rejected the bankruptcy judge’s
reading of Missouri law. In Hoit v. Rankin12 the court announced,
“Though we are unable to overrule Killman, we can instruct that its
analysis is not accurate and should not be followed.”13 In Hoit, two
couples – a mother and stepfather and a son and daughter-in-law – took
title to a house in joint tenancy, planning to occupy it together. The
entire purchase price was supplied by the mother and stepfather. The
8

In re Killman, 2010 WL 743685, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Feb. 26, 2010).
Id. at *4. By a subsequent conveyance the mother’s interest had been converted
into a life estate, the remainder being held by the daughters in joint tenancy. The change
of the bankrupt’s share from a present to a vested future interest was irrelevant to the
issue in Killman. Id. at *4.
10 Id. at *7.
11 Id. at *3 (citing Christen v. Christen, 38 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)
(quoting Montgomery v. Roberts, 714 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)) (emphasis
added).
12 320 S.W.3d 761 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010).
13 Id. at 770 n.14.
9
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joint living arrangement swiftly deteriorated, and the mother and stepfather moved out and brought an action for partition. In this case a family
relationship obviously did exist between the mother and son (if not also
among the respective in-laws), so the question became whether the presumption of equal shares that this raised was rebuttable. Ruling that it
was, the trial court heard testimony that the mother and stepfather had
not intended to give the son and daughter-in-law any interest in the
property “at the time of purchase or at any time during their lifetimes”
but only “upon their deaths,”14 and awarded the house outright to the
plaintiffs.15
Affirming the decision below, the appellate court in Hoit traced the
source of the statement of Missouri law that the bankruptcy judge had
applied in Killman to a popular property hornbook stating that the presumption of equal shares may be rebutted by proof of unequal contributions when “there is neither a family relationship among the co-tenants
nor any evidence of donative intent on the part of those who contributed more than their pro rata amounts.”16 Subsequent Court of Appeals cases had treated the presumption of equal shares as irrebuttable
despite unequal contributions when there is any “evidence of a family
relationship and donative intent.”17 The court in Hoit rejected this view
of the law and upbraided the law professor authors for misleading the
courts and “elevating a common sense principle of evidence into a principle which reads like an irrebuttable presumption.”18 The court in Hoit
also rejected the position in Corpus Juris Secundum19 and some states20
that the rebuttal must be by clear and convincing evidence and applied
only a “substantial evidence” standard.21
*

*

*

The root of the problem is that the different estates serve different
purposes. The tenancy by the entirety provides security during marriage
and guaranteed succession at death. It is reasonable to presume that
14

Id. at 763.
Id. at 765.
16 Id. at 766 (citing Montgomery v. Roberts, 714 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986) (quoting ROGER CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.2 (1984)). The
same statement appears in the latest edition of the hornbook, WILLIAM STOEBUCK &
DALE WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.2, p. 180 (3d ed. 2000).
17 320 S.W. 3d at 766.
18 Id. at 768; accord Hoth v. Hoth, 339 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (concluding uncontested evidence and the absence of evidence to the contrary rebutted the
presumption of equal ownership in a tenancy in common).
19 86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 13 (1997).
20 See, e.g., Dillingham v. Dillingham, 688 S.E.2d 499, 504 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
21 Hoit, 320 S.W.3d at 768.
15
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equal shares are intended despite unequal contributions in case divorce
converts the estate into a tenancy in common. But even here there may
be exceptional cases in which a contrary intention can be shown, such as
a premarital agreement that expressly provides for unequal distribution
in case of divorce. Unmarried persons and married persons in states
that do not recognize tenancy by the entirety must take title as joint
tenants or as tenants in common. Where their relationship resembles
that of a traditional family, as with the tenants in common in Hofstad, a
sympathetic court may apply the same rule in case of their separation
that would be applied to divorced tenants by the entirety.
Joint tenancy offers the right of survivorship and for that reason it
is sometimes used by parents to provide for succession at death, as in
Killman and Hoit. The difficulty, as the mother discovered in Killman,
is that a transfer in joint tenancy, unlike other “will substitutes” such as
a transfer-on-death deed or a will, creates a present interest.22 Nevertheless, it is difficult to disagree with the court in Hoit that evidence of a
contrary intention should at least be considered, even when there is a
family relationship. The first two presumptions discussed in this article
– cotenants’ shares are presumed equal absent evidence of an intention
to the contrary, and unequal contributions are presumed to indicate an
intention that the shares are unequal – are certainly rebuttable. There is
no reason to conclude that the third presumption – unequal contributions by persons in a family relationship are presumed to be gifts – is
any different.

22

See John V. Orth, The Perils of Joint Tenancies, 44 REAL PROP. Tr. & Est. L.J. 427
(2009); see also John V. Orth, The Paradoxes of Joint Tenancies, 46 REAL PROP. TR. &
EST. L.J. 483 (2012).

